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This essay explores the social and political role and significance of the 
intellectuals within capitalist society. It sets out to define the intellectual 
and the nature of what they produce (ideas) and their relationship to broader 
class relations. It shows how key Marxist thinkers provide the basis for a 
socio-economic understanding of the activities and products of the 
intellectual. At the heart of transforming the current role of the intellectual 
within the existing divisions of labour, lies the project to democratise the 
social role of the intellectuals. This requires expanding the social base of 
the intellectuals and connecting their activities to a self-reflexive project of 
social and political transformation. This is the basis and definition of truly 
critical thought. In this essay we discuss how Marx and Engels’ began the 
task of establishing a theoretical framework for a historical and materialist 
account of the intellectuals in The German Ideology. We show how the 
Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci further developed our understanding of the 
intellectual and we clarify and add to his key distinctions between the 
traditional and organic intellectual. Having set out the theoretical 
framework and broad philosophical and political implications of the 
intellectual, we then look at role of the intellectual in the post-Second 
World War era, up to our contemporary moment. We discuss the 
relationship between the middle class and the hegemonic intellectual, the 
difficulties posed for the middle class intellectual to be genuinely counter-
hegemonic and the need for the reconstitution of organic intellectuals from 
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the working class. Finally we explore these issues in relation to the media 
and especially oppositional digital and social media practices.  
 
 
Marx and Engels on the Intellectuals 
The starting point for thinking about a Marxist conception of the role of 
intellectuals must be Marx and Engels’ work The German Ideology. It is 
here that they begin to situate intellectuals in relation to the dominant class 
forces. “The class which has the means of material production at its 
disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production 
at its disposal ” (Marx and Engels 1989, 64). This formulation would grow 
in relevance with the development of the mass media. At the same time, the 
very growth of what Ensenzberger later called the ‘industrialisation of the 
mind’ (Ensenzberger 1982) would require the development of a 
sophisticated account of intellectual production that could avoid the twin 
traps of reducing it to the economic class interests of the dominant class 
who formally own the media or believing that it transcended class relations 
and struggle. Marx and Engels noted that “mental production” was 
delegated to the “thinkers of the class (its active, conceptive ideologists)]” 
(Marx and Engel 1989, 65). The beginnings of an account of intellectual 
production that could register how it may be affected by broader social, 
political and economic changes and conflicts is evident where they state 
that a “cleavage” between intellectuals and the dominant class “can develop 
into a certain opposition and hostility”, although they are also (overly) 
quick to state this conflict “automatically comes to nothing” if the dominant 
class to which the intellectuals are attached, are “endangered” (Marx and 
Engels 1989,65). Their own political trajectory suggests that this is not 
necessarily the case. 
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Marx and Engels no doubt had in mind in this section of The German 
Ideology the German intellectuals and philosophers from whose ranks they 
emerged in the 1840s and from whom they wished to establish an 
epistemological and political break. The German Ideology opens with a 
satirical account of the post-Hegelian scene, in which Left and Right 
Hegelians fought over the legacy and meaning of the master philosopher 
Hegel, who had died in 1831. In the minds of said protagonists, these 
philosophical battles were momentous, a “revolution beside which the 
French Revolution was child’s play” (Marx and Engels 1989, 39).  
Dissecting the moment, Marx and Engels lampoon the series of fashions 
and fads to which this intellectual production fell victim.  In terms that 
seem strikingly relevant today, they pinpoint how commodification and 
competition erodes the authentic usefulness of ideas which suffer a gradual 
“deterioration in quality, adulteration of the raw materials, falsification of 
labels”, the results of which “is now being extolled and interpreted to us as 
a revolution of world significance, the begetter of the most prodigious 
results and achievements” (Marx and Engels 1989, 39-40). With only a 
little less of a sweeping dismissal, these words do seem more than a little 
pertinent to some of our own intellectual ‘revolutions’ in recent years. 
The problem for Marx and Engel’s was that the Left Hegelian 
‘revolutionary’ philosophy “never quitted the realm of philosophy” (Marx 
and Engels 1989, 40). As a result, methodologically it remained flawed in 
its ability to ground idea-systems in their real conditions of existence. “It 
has not occurred to these philosophers” Marx and Engels noted, “to inquire 
into the connection of German philosophy with German reality, the relation 
of their criticism to their own material surroundings” (Marx and Engels 
1989, 41). It was this lack of self-reflexive interrogation that made German 
philosophy an ideology. Their own philosophy, historical materialism, 
would break with this lack of self-reflexivity and provide the basis for a 
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socio-economic understanding of the activities of the intellectual. The 
intellectual and the most prestigious form of intellectual production, 
philosophy, could not, in their view, be seen as some free-floating, 
universal group transcending social conflicts. Ideas and the producers of 
those ideas had to be socially contextualised.  
Along with this methodological break there was a political break to be 
made from the Left Hegelians. The intimations of change, the analysis of 
the need for change, the need to identify the forces of change and press 
them forward in a progressive direction, could not occur unless philosophy 
was integrated into those social forces and political action. As Marx 
famously put it in the Twelfth Thesis on Feuerbach: “The philosophers have 
only interpreted the world in various ways, the point is to change it” (Marx 
and Engels 1989, 123). In re-uniting philosophy with democratic social 
change Marx and Engels aim no less than to set in reverse the entire 
historical development of intellectual production and consciousness in class 
societies. This development has been marked by the division of labour 
between manual and intellectual labour and within the latter, the 
development of ever more specialised regions such as philosophy, ethics, 
theology, law, etc. (Marx and Engels 1989, 51-2).  
 The basis of a democratic conception of the intellectual is at least 
sketched out in this early work. Since consciousness for Marx and Engels 
develops out of our everyday practical productive life, satisfaction of needs 
and the production of new needs and the co-operation this requires, then an 
explicit and self-conscious reconnection of intellectual functions to the 
social production of life would seem both possible and desirable. Habermas 
argued that by “turning the construction of the manifestation of 
consciousness into an encoded representation of the self-production of the 
species, Marx discloses the mechanism of progress in the experience of 
reflection…” (Habermas 1978, 43). Yet Habermas warned that this was 
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vitiated by the fact that self-reflection was reduced to and made identical 
with labour. In so doing Marx “reduces the process of reflection to the level 
of instrumental action”  (Habermas 1978, 44).  If this were the case then 
Marx would be no more than a philosopher of the factory, as it were. But 
Marx neither saw labour in such instrumental terms (he saw it as 
intrinsically creative even if tasked with meeting certain historical needs) 
nor saw the intellectual and creative functions as having their highest 
manifestation necessarily within the material production of the species. 
Marx’s philosophy is perfectly capable of sustaining the view that our 
intellectual activities find their highest culmination in culture, 
communication and aesthetics, where some distanciation from immediate 
needs have been established (Wayne 2014, 140-48). Historical materialism 
is not reductionist in relation to consciousness and its specialised 
manifestations, it merely poses the crucial question: what are the 
methodological and political-moral implications of the idea that intellectual 
activity has certain conditions of existence that involve the totality of 
society?  
The question of the actual and desirable relationship between the 
intellectual and other forms of labour is significant primarily because it is 
capitalism that has the instrumental view of labour (which Habermas 
uncritically accepts in its impoverished form as inevitable). Furthermore, 
today it is capitalism that poses a clear and present danger in reducing 
intellectual activity to serving the needs of the labour process, subordinate 
as it is to capital, and thus eliminating the critical component of reflective 
thought. In order to realise that critical component Marx and Engels 
recommended articulating thought to those social agents struggling for 
progressive change. The internal conflicts within the ‘conceptive ideologists’ 
of the dominant class (the fight between the Right and Left Hegelians) were 
not insignificant. It helped expand the repertoire of discourses available and 
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seed the ideas for change. However, for these seeds of change to be 
activated required intellectuals to break both methodologically and 
politically with the dominant class. This is what Marx and Engels did in 
fact do. 
 
Gramsci on the Intellectuals 
The Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) has widely and rightly 
been seen as making a significant contribution to the Marxist understanding 
of the role of intellectuals. Like Marx and Engels he argued for a 
democratic conception of intellectual activity. Taking the most prestigious 
form of intellectual production, philosophy, as an example, he argued that 
“all men [sic] are “philosophers”’ insofar as everyone has a specific 
conception of the world, a “worldview” which they have forged out of their 
experience and circumstance. The task was to develop philosophy, both in 
its specialised form as scholarship and in its everyday form, into “critical 
awareness” (Gramsci 1967, 58).  As we have seen, for Marx and Engels, the 
philosophy of the intellectuals would develop its critical potential the more 
it could interrogate its conditions of existence. With a slight nuancing, the 
same prescription was applied to the philosophy of everyday life. Gramsci 
argued that it needed to develop critical awareness by a) not accepting ideas 
and value-systems passively from the dominant institutions in society and 
b) overcoming its fragmented and disparate character and developing itself 
as a systematic and coherent worldview in the way traditional philosophers 
have had the time to do with their own more ‘rarefied’ systems. The ideal of 
developing a popular form of critical philosophy would have to overcome 
and address a number of problems concerning the actual historical 
development of intellectual production and its relationship to powerful 
socio-economic groups. It would have to overcome firstly the fact that “All 
men [sic] are intellectuals…but not all men have in society the function of 
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intellectuals” (Gramsci 1998, 9). This is the division between intellectual 
and manual labour. Secondly, within the ‘function of intellectuals’ there are 
different types of intellectuals.  
Gramsci identified two types of intellectuals. The first were what he 
called the traditional intellectuals, which he defined rather ambiguously in 
both historical terms and social-ideological terms. The historical definition 
of traditional intellectuals refers to the way intellectuals associated with one 
mode of production need to be assimilated by the intellectuals associated 
with a rising class and a new mode of production. So that for example, the 
intellectuals of the feudal mode of production (clerics, scholars, artists) had 
to be integrated and re-functioned according to the new practices and needs 
of the capitalist mode of production (Gramsci 1998, 10-11). Likewise, the 
intellectuals developed within capitalism would become the ‘traditional’ 
intellectuals vis-à-vis the development of a socialist mode of production, 
and again would need to be assimilated into new social priorities and needs. 
Gramsci also defined traditional intellectuals as those within the capitalist 
mode of production that remained remote and aloof from the economic and 
political needs of the capitalist class despite their assimilation. Again clerics 
and philosophers and perhaps much of the arts and humanities within the 
academy might once have fallen within this type of intellectual function, 
where non-instrumental metaphysical values could be articulated. These 
intellectuals are ‘traditional’ when compared to Gramsci’s other main 
category: organic intellectuals. 
To understand the concept of organic intellectuals, we have to first 
relate this concept to two other concepts in Gramsci’s work: the economic-
corporative and hegemony.  Gramsci argues that the political consciousness 
of a dominant class is one which must move beyond merely a defence of its 
own economic interests. It must move firstly to unite with other fractions of 
its own class, in the way that different kinds of capital, such as industrial, 
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financial, commercial and landed capital have historically done. If a class 
stays at just this level of defending its economic interests, it stays at the 
level of the economic-corporative. Beyond establishing intra-class cohesion 
a dominant class must move beyond their own collective interests and 
command the moral-political terrain across society, so as to convince all 
other classes that their interests can be met by aligning themselves with or 
accepting the rule of the dominant class. When a dominant class achieves 
this, it is not merely dominant but also hegemonic (Gramsci 1988, 205-6). 
By hegemonic, Gramsci means that this is a class that wins (at least to some 
degree) the consent of the exploited classes to their situation.  
It is the role of the organic intellectuals to produce this consent and to 
do so they work primarily to change and influence culture, morality and 
political agendas. Classically, organic intellectuals would have been found 
in political parties, in the top most prestigious newspapers, in public 
relations and advertising and perhaps today also in think tanks. These 
intellectuals are tied organically to the economic and political needs of the 
dominant class. In recent times, these are the thinkers, commentators, 
editors, writers, broadcasters and so forth that try and persuade the general 
population that neo-liberalism means progressive reform. 
However, Gramsci also refers to the practical organisers of production, 
the scientist and the engineer for example, and today also we would say 
managers, as intellectuals. We might think that the organic intellectual 
would automatically include these kinds of intellectuals organised at the 
heart of the production process. But this interpretation is at odds with 
Gramsci’s analysis of the economic-corporate activity of the dominant 
classes and the need to go beyond their immediate economic needs and 
build political alliances and broader political-moral projects (such as neo-
liberalism). A number of writers have suggested that with the expansion of 
corporate and state bureaucracies, the economic-corporate role of the 
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intellectual, working within and primarily concerned with the needs of the 
state or the company, has expanded (Boggs 1993, and see Pratschke in this 
volume).  This has led to the expansion and redefinition of intellectual 
functions that are neither ‘traditional’ because they are so obviously tied to 
the dynamic and moving terrain of occupations responding to economic 
forces, nor are they ‘organic’ in the sense that their agenda is more focused 
on the smooth functioning of an apparatus rather than the broader project of 
public persuasion and politics. We need then to supplement Gramsci’s 
analysis with a new category, that of the technocratic intellectual. This is 
the ‘expert’ in science, engineering, law, economics, management, even the 
trade union leader and negotiator, etc. They embody specialised and 
instrumentalised forms of knowledge. They work within the framework of 
policy, which ultimately stems from the broader political struggle 
conducted on the terrain of the masses and the organic intellectuals. They 
administer but do not determine, they examine how things work but not 
why things work as they do, and within that framework they may produce 
new solutions, products and ideas.  If they become great advocates of such 
new ideas and practices that re-shape how we look at the world more 
broadly, from Henry Ford to Steve Jobs, then they lift themselves out from 
the merely technocratic intellectual onto the terrain of the organic 
intellectual.  The technocratic intellectual, long dominant in the natural and 
social sciences, has been in the last few decades, reshaping the humanities 
and arts as well as the critical social sciences. Edward Said argues that the 
greatest threat to independent intellectual thought comes from the 
dominance of this technocratic type of intellectual. For Said: 
 
The major choice faced by the intellectual is whether to be allied 
with the stability of the victors and rulers or – the more difficult 
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path – to consider that stability as a state of emergency threatening 
the less fortunate (Said 1996, 35). 
 
We can now tabulate the different types of intellectual functions we 
have discussed: 
 
1. Traditional: either eclipsed by the new rising class and/or the 
economically and politically marginalised intellectuals within 
capitalism. 
 
2. Technocratic: numerically the biggest class of contemporary 
intellectual activity, working within economic-corporative horizons.  
 
3. Organic Intellectuals.  They are defined not by their occupation but 
by the scope and compass of the change they seek to initiate. 
This category can be subdivided between:  
 
      i) Hegemonic organic intellectuals who work on behalf of the 
capitalist class and whose main business is in helping to shape the 
broader political-moral, social and cultural agenda.  
 
     ii) Counter-Hegemonic organic intellectuals. They work to call the 
dominant frames of reference, the dominant assumptions, and the 
dominant policy trends that favour capitalism, into question. They are 
organically tied to the classes and groups for whom stability is ‘a state 
of emergency’. This group can in turn be sub-divided between:  
 
ii. a) those that, like Marx and Engels, come from the middle classes 
but who have distanced themselves from the hegemonic group 
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politically, psychologically and ideally, in terms of their practices (but 
often they fall short of this crucial need to democratise their practices, 
retaining instead the stamp of elitism); 
 
 ii. b) those intellectuals that develop from within the working classes 
and other subaltern groups (but who must resist assimilation and 
neutralisation within the established institutions). 
 
Organic Intellectuals Today 
 
In his 1967 essay on the role of the intellectual in Western democracies 
Chomsky considered the intellectual in relation to the concepts of 
responsibility, power and truth seeking. He argued that their relative power 
bestows upon them a responsibility to interrogate, critique and expose the 
disastrous effects of right wing ideologies. 
 
Intellectuals are in a position to expose the lies of governments, 
to analyse actions according to their causes and motives and 
often hidden intentions. In the Western world, at least, they 
have the power that comes from political liberty, from access to 
information and freedom of expression. For a privileged 
minority, Western democracy provides the leisure, the facilities, 
and the training to seek the truth lying hidden behind the veil of 
distortion and misrepresentation, ideology and class interest, 
through which the events of current history are presented to us 
(Chomsky 1988, 60) 
 
There are two significant contextual points to be made here. Firstly 
Chomsky was writing in relation to the Vietnam War over fifty years ago. 
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It was a challenge to the intellectuals of the time to expose the lies that 
were disseminated in order to justify a war that killed over a million people 
in total. Secondly he is referring here to a particular kind of intellectual, 
that is the counter hegemonic intellectual. As we have pointed out in the 
discussion of Gramsci, we can consider the role of intellectuals in two 
ways as hegemonic or as counter hegemonic. While the type of intellectual 
Chomsky refers to is one that works to expose the facade of the powerful 
there are intellectuals who can just as easily play a role in reinforcing the 
status quo. The Vietnam War as with the Iraq War in 2003 had its 
intellectual cheerleaders, giving power the gloss of higher ideals (the 2003 
war was we were told about defending and extending freedom, democracy, 
etc.).  
Conventionally those who are considered to be intellectuals –or we 
could call them professional thinkers -have hailed from the upper and 
middle classes. This is not because these groups possess an inherent 
intelligence consistently absent from the working class. Rather it is because 
those from the middle and upper class designated as intellectuals -or as 
Gramsci would have it fulfilling the function of the intellectual- are in 
possession of the social, cultural and economic capital that makes such a 
designation possible and ensures they are recognised and acknowledged as 
such by other members of their class. This means it is possible to 
understand the hegemonic intellectual not in relation to a superior ‘intellect’ 
(whatever that might mean) but in terms of their significant role in the  
reproduction of the socio -economic relations of capital. 
It remains true today that the majority of contemporary hegemonic 
organic intellectuals in the UK are drawn from the middle and upper 
classes. The decision-making professions within which many institutional 
intellectuals operate are dominated by privately educated Oxbridge 
graduates who posses a shared culture, value system and set of attitudes 
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which when taken together coalesce into a world view which they hold in 
common. The link between education and the production of intellectuals 
has meant that formal education has been a crucial filter by which to 
reproduce an intellectual class dedicated to reproducing the class system 
(Reay 2010, 400). It is within the private education system and the 
universities of Oxford and Cambridge that the middle and upper class 
intellectuals learn about the way in which the world works. Here they are 
prepared to run that world as if opposition to their view of the world is a 
deviance from the norm. 
What this means in effect is that as members of a middle class elite 
whose perspective is universalised, intellectual engagement with the 
condition of society and the way in which it is organised and regulated is 
filtered through the sensibilities of those for whom the prevailing structural 
arrangements do not appear to be alienating and exploitative. Whilst there is 
no suggestion that the hegemonic intellectual is unable to engage critically 
with the world –indeed they even, at times, are able to appear radical- the 
depth of their analysis and level of critical engagement is typically limited 
because the position they inhabit is a privileged one. Consequently their 
radicalism only appears as such when presented to other hegemonic 
intellectuals. Significantly their intellectual endeavour evaluates the 
immediate situation and typically accepts the given parameters in place to 
make sense of that situation while a more critical intellect “evaluates 
evaluations” (Hofstadter 1966, 25). As Schwartz has pointed out many 
university students are aware of the reason that corporate boardrooms 
should promote diversity “but few question the concept of corporate rule 
itself” (2013,184) . 
If the role of the critical intellectual as Chomsky claims is to make 
public what the powerful would rather keep hidden, we need to recognise 
the significance of this in relation to a contemporary society consistently 
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divided along class lines and to realise any intellectual endeavour wishing 
to ‘evaluate the evaluation’ must eventually engage with the question of 
class and the unequal distribution of economic and cultural resources which 
class divisions rest upon. It is the approach to this question we would argue 
that separates the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic intellectual. As Marx 
made clear it is only by engaging with the question of class, the ways in 
which class is structured and reconfigured over time, that we can begin to 
understand the nature of capitalism and come to terms with his claim:  “the 
history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles” 
(Marx 1985, 79). 
The crucial point here is that for the hegemonic middle class 
intellectual, class is not an overtly exploitative or antagonistic relationship. 
Their experiential horizons are confined by lives of privilege where the 
politics of identity takes a primary position. The last thirty years of 
neoliberalism has witnessed class as a source of intellectual analysis take 
second place to the politics of race, sexuality and gender, concepts that 
affect the middle class the most. In the meantime economic inequality has 
increased to historically high levels, the working class have been 
incrementally excluded from the public sphere and immigrants forced to live 
and work in the most appalling conditions. Yet those in positions of 
intellectual power have normalised and universalised this inequality. While 
their own class world becomes normalised questions of class, which are 
essential to any transformative process, are secondary. This has allowed for 
an on-going abdication of any responsibility towards the working class and 
no demand for a critical self-interrogation necessary to consider the role 
class plays in the social relations of exploitation. As Marx has made clear, it 
is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their 
social being that determines consciousness (Marx 1977, 181). While it is 
possible, through social change and political events  (e.g. war, political 
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revolutions, etc.) for consciousness to be reconfigured and established 
dominant patterns of social conditioning that has formerly shaped a life to 
be questioned, the tendency is for social being to produce the consciousness 
that is most conducive for the reproduction (within a range) of the social 
relationships in which social being is formed. 
The problem then becomes one of praxis; of intellectual work that is 
able to inquire into and evaluate the connection between ideas and their 
material affects and translate them into new ways of being as Marx and 
Engels called for in The German Ideology. The process of re-evaluating 
ideas about the world can bring about the potential to transform the world. 
Thus conservatives and liberals are certainly not averse to acknowledging 
that inequality exists, but they never come up with policy ideas that could 
remotely change this situation. When they are confronted with policy ideas 
that could have a positive impact on inequality, they attack those ideas as 
‘extreme’ because they encroach, necessarily on the prerogatives of private 
property.  Gramsci linked the economic rule of the elites to the complex 
practices of everyday existence where to a great extent there is an 
unquestioned conformity to the rules and conventions of a given social order.  
This intellectual acceptance of hegemonic boundaries, this refusal to 
surmount the imposed limitations of the institutions, politics and ideological 
framework of neoliberalism, illuminates the distinction to be made between 
the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic intellectual.  
Non-conformity to these rules, a refusal to live by their precepts, 
engenders in the counter-hegemonic intellectual the condition of potential 
isolation and marginalisation and indicates an acknowledgement that 
analysis is informed by and dependent upon action – and vice versa. At 
present the hegemonic power of the dominating groups is such that the 
critical analysis required for strategic explorations of the consequences of 
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objective material structures exists in isolation from the action required to 
transform society.   
This is no more apparent than in the claim associated with the Occupy 
movement that began in the US: ‘we are the 99%’.  This slogan functioned 
to differentiate the majority from the obscenely rich capitalist class minority 
right at the top of society. We would argue that this contradictory model of 
inclusivity is problematic and functions to exclude the working class by 
smoothing out the differences in lives that are significantly different within 
the majority. On the one hand the slogan draws attention to a powerful 
global elite at the top of society who exist in a shadowy world of financial 
deals and political agreements. At the same time it eradicates the 
peculiarities, oppressions and exploitative relationships of many members of 
the working class and the very real class differences and conflicts that exist 
between groups within the 99%. This collapsing of the working classes and 
the more privileged lives of the confortable middle class into one 
homogenous mass inevitably functions to exclude the working class from 
the struggle for change and leads to a weakening of the potential to build 
intellectual and political arguments and crucially, anti capitalist alliances 
that acknowledge the material realities of working class life. As a ‘unifying’ 
slogan it is unable to engage with the complexities of a classed stratified, 
multi ethnic globalised world. What is envisaged, as a tool against 
neoliberalism becomes in effect a method of annihilation – a theoretical and 
essentialising meme which both conceptually and practically results in the 
destruction of the working class as a category. Similarly, orthodox Marxist 
conceptions which equate ‘the working class’ with wage-labour are 
problematic, since they disavow the different types and levels of cultural, 
social and economic advantage the middle class wage-labourer has, as well 
as their position of administrative, managerial or intellectual dominance 
over other strata within the category of ‘working class’. 
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This returns us to the concept of praxis and its relationship to working 
class intellectuals. What it demonstrates is the need for the middle class 
intellectual to adequately address their relationship to existing structures 
and patterns of inequality in which they are implicated and their increasing 
control of the means of communication, their domination of the media, 
academia and other decision making professions, all of which are conduits 
for the transmission of power and the construction of ideology (O’Neill 
and Wayne 2013).  The truly counter-hegemonic middle class intellectual 
who seeks an organic relation to the working class must remember that, as 
Marx wrote in ‘The Theses on Feuerbach’, “it is essential to educate the 
educator” (Marx and Engels 1989,121). A dialectical relationship of 
mutual learning means that organic intellectuals must also emerge from 
within the working class. 
The counter-hegemonic working class intellectual traditionally was 
dependent on organisations and institutions such as trade unions, adult 
education institutions and socialist parties (Rose 2001) to provide the 
means to develop as counter-hegemonic thinkers. Yet neoliberalism has 
progressively destroyed or neutralised these organisations. It is a political 
truism to claim neoliberalism is responsible for the rolling back of the 
welfare state and the destruction of the public services that function within 
it. One of the consequences of this is a shrinking of the public sphere and 
the access to it that is essential to making subaltern voices heard 
(Wacquant 2008). 
Neoliberalism has destroyed the fabric of the communities in which 
the working class found material and ideological strength and in the 
process strategically depoliticised the working class. The left intelligentsia 
has receded into a kind of “ideological policing” (Hall 2012, 9) obsessed 
with theories of differences and transgression that has resulted in its 
increasing insignificance and the erosion of the concept (and practice) of 
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social solidarity.  Schwartz reinforces this point in his discussion of radical 
theory: 
 
As the right’s growing hegemony from the 1980s onwards eroded 
majoritarian support for progressive taxation and universal public 
goods, radical theory, through its dominant concerns for 
difference and transgression, abandoned any intellectual defence 
of the core democratic value of social democracy (Schwartz 2013, 
395). 
 
The destruction of the civil society in which the working class had 
established some organisational and institutional bases, has also eroded the 
links between the working class and the middle class. Middle class 
intellectuals could once be rooted in working class struggles such as trade 
union movements, social movements (such as Lesbians and Gays Support 
the Miners) or in the colleges and working-men’s institutes, civil rights 
protests, and so forth. As all of these have become weakened, so the role of 
the counter-hegemonic radical intellectual has declined. Our reading of this 
situation leads us to suggest that the middle class counter-hegemonic 
intellectual requires movements and working class intellectuals to work 
along side and to learn form. A symbolic moment when the working class 
counter-hegemonic intellectual and the institutional production of middle 
class intellectuals converged, was Jimmy Reid’s 1972 inaugural address as 
Rector of Glasgow University. Reid was a leading figure in the 1971 work-
in to save the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders from bankruptcy. In Britain now it 
is virtually unthinkable for a University to appoint a radical trade union 
leader to such a position and to acknowledge that the ‘educators need 
educating’. Ours in not the era to give such a platform, such a vindication 
and such an acknowledgement, to a radical organic intellectual of the 
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working class.  In his famous address Reid made a direct appeal to the 
students as intellectuals in the making: 
 
A rat race is for rats. We're not rats. We're human beings. Reject 
the insidious pressures in society that would blunt your critical 
faculties to all that is happening around you, that would caution 
silence in the face of injustice lest you jeopardise your chances of 
promotion and self-advancement. This is how it starts, and before 
you know where you are, you're a fully paid-up member of the rat-
pack (Reid 2010). 
 
Yet if the old established platforms (the universities, the press) have 
become integrated into the neoliberal order and hostile to participation 
of the working class as critical thinkers, new spaces have opened up 
around the digital media. 
  
Counter-Hegemonic Spaces and the Digital Media 
In our multi-media saturated society the significance of the media as a site 
of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic struggle takes on a dynamic role in 
framing our social and historical experiences and the ways in which they 
are interpreted, evaluated and made sense of. Within the dominant media 
environment, the processes of public debate, policy-making and political 
power are asymmetrically skewed towards both the middle classes and 
large capital interests. The dominant media are run by middle class 
intellectuals who largely operate within the spectrum of liberal and 
conservative thought and opinion in the current period. In the UK, the 
leading editorial thinkers on the premier liberal paper The Guardian have 
overwhelmingly been privately educated and went through Oxford or 
Cambridge.  They police the boundaries of the acceptable and at their more 
From: Considering Class: Theory, Culture and the Media in the 21st Century 
Brill 2018. 
‘radical’ end of the spectrum they present as counter-hegemonic 
intellectuals and ‘left-wing firebrands’.  The ideological effect of 
incorporating ‘radical’ politics inside such dominant organs is that 
anything outside those boundaries can be labelled and dismissed as 
‘extremist’.  
One example of the policing of who gets to speak, where and on what 
issues is Russell Brand.  Brand crossed boundaries that unsettled the 
established hierarchies and divisions of labour. Here was an ‘entertainer’ 
who became politicised and began commenting critically on political 
matters. But he was also from a working class background that was outside 
the golden Oxbridge circle and this seemed for many liberals to disqualify 
him to speak on political issues and be a political actor (See Fisher 2013, 
El-Gingihy 2014 and for an example of the established political 
commentators’ collective noses being firmly put out of joint, O’Hagan 
2014). 1 In particular his critique of the current state of representative 
democracy in the UK and its inability to bring about progressive change 
(through voting) enraged many in the political and media class who are 
invested in the status quo. Brand disrupted the middle class norms of style 
in the way he talked (the accent and content), the way he dressed, his very 
tactile interactions with interviewers, etc., all spoke to an informal 
unpredictability that was seen as a symbolic attack on ‘serious discourse’. 
Brand launched his Trews news channel on You Tube which has more than 
one million subscribers and which regularly makes the media itself and 
their questionable shaping of the public agenda, his topic. 2 The 
development and popularisation of such media literacy is an important 
component of the oppositional digital and social media world, which 
defines its identity precisely in terms of its difference from the dominant 
media. The dominant media in turn fear this growing media literacy and 
meta-commentary on its practices since it calls them to account and 
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deconstructs the naturalisation of the dominant media’s perspectives. The 
success of Brand’s Trews channel demonstrates that the digital and social 
media also threaten the dominant media in terms of audience reach and not 
just ideological critique. 
Social media and digital media may also be seen as a counter-
hegemonic model of labour or intellectual production.  In contrast to those 
that have a corporate contract, bloggers, micro-bloggers, commentators, 
memes, online papers, You Tube political rappers such as bin-man Sean 
Donnelly (NXTGen) and so on, produce material in their spare time and in 
most cases for free. 3  The demographic background of the politicised 
social media are far more diverse than the narrow private school/Oxbridge 
nexus that filters and shapes the formation of British intellectuals.  
Although social media is often criticised for encouraging a privatised and 
individualistic politics (the so-called ‘keyboard activist’), we would argue 
that it can be a perfect example of praxis. Social media offers a means of 
offering clear and succinct explanations of what is happening and why it is 
happening; it provides the ‘theory’ in a idiom that is accessible to non-
academics, and that can seed political action.  
The digital and social media help produce horizontal communication 
that is very important in helping people overcome the sense of isolation 
and marginalisation that one feels when they have political views and 
opinions that find little or no place in the dominant media. In such a 
situation of tacit censorship it is easy to believe that few people share those 
beliefs and opinions, and this can lead to a demoralising atomisation of the 
left.  Since many of the public spaces where working class people used to 
congregate have been decimated, virtual networks in the social media have 
provided one forum to reconstitute such opportunities for conversation and 
knowledge exchange. As with any other form of media, the social and 
digital media can be used for a variety of purposes, including highly 
From: Considering Class: Theory, Culture and the Media in the 21st Century 
Brill 2018. 
reactionary ones. But the left has often shown itself to be suspicious of 
social and digital media as a mode of political engagement and this has 
meant underestimating its potentialities, or concentrating exclusively (in a 
reaction to the techno-determinists and techno-utopians) on the way the 
political economy of the internet for example is dominated by corporations 
(Dean 2009). 
Gramsci’s argument that everyone is an intellectual but that only 
some people have the social function of being intellectuals is relevant here. 
We are arguing that the digital and social media enormously expands the 
range of people who can assume the social function of being an intellectual. 
The genre of citizen journalism has been enriched by an influx of counter-
hegemonic intellectuals who do not respect the narrow norms and rules of 
political discourse. To take one random example, Rachel Swindon has 
been micro-blogging on her Twitter account exposing Conservative MPs 
who voted to cut benefits while spending thousands of pounds of public 
money on their expenses claims.  Interestingly this was a story in the 
dominant media back in 2009. But what Swindon has done is firstly pursue 
the story consistently over time, demonstrating that little has changed, 
whereas the dominant media tend to move on and have largely left the 
issue behind. Secondly, she has linked the on-going issue of MP’s 
expenses to the brutal cuts in benefits under austerity politics. By contrast 
the dominant news media keep such issues separate, thus failing to make 
the connections that reveal the class dynamics of the social totality. On the 
back of this successful campaign (she has more than twenty-two thousand 
Twitter followers at the time of writing) Swindon has launched a blog 
declaring that the British media are failing to hold the Conservative 
government to account. Subscription models from readers/supporters often 
provide some financial support for this kind of citizen journalism. 
 






Praxis is the integration of theoretical activities that have been cut off from 
the widest possible social base and restricted to elite demographics and 
narrow circles of action and knowledge. This is why Marx, Engels and 
Gramsci called for philosophy, the most elite but also most highly 
developed system of thought, to be brought back into contact with not 
‘reality’ (since philosophy is hardly unreal) but the reality of the lives of the 
majority. Education – in the broadest sense and not just in formal 
institutions – is therefore a crucial part of developing praxis. Praxis means 
not only linking theory and practice, as it is typically defined, but 
democratising who gets to have access to those frameworks, perspectives 
and intellectual resources that provide the basis of critical thought and 
critical action.   
The system-integrated intellectuals take different forms: the traditional 
intellectuals, remote from the immediate political or economic needs of 
capitalism, have always been on hand to provide spiritual, artistic, 
philosophical or other ideals that have provided important resources for the 
bourgeoisie in the ideological struggle. The organic intellectuals – those 
elites within the intellectual elite - who link the economic interests of the 
capitalist class with the broader strategic political and cultural goals of the 
class, fight the ideological struggle in the more immediate, day-to-day 
battle over the direction of social life. The massed ranks of the technocratic 
intellectuals follow their lead in the myriad institutions of modern society. 
It is from this dense bloc of integration that the middle class counter-
hegemonic intellectual must emerge. Radical social change will need the 
critical leverage and resources within existing public opinion formation 
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which intellectuals from the middle class already have. The contradiction 
between their access to the most sophisticated intellectual culture and the 
absurdity and irrationality of capitalism has often thrown them into conflict 
with it. But counter-posing rationality against the evident waste and crisis 
tendencies of capitalism does not break down the privileged superiority of 
the intellectuals.  
Intellectuals from the middle class can only play a truly counter-
hegemonic role if they are sufficiently and critically self-reflexive about the 
class divisions and competitive culture from which they have emerged. 
Their educational privilege “creates a bond of solidarity which attaches him 
[sic] to his class, and still more attaches his class to him” (Benjamin 1998, 
102). Even the ‘proletarianisation’ of the intellectual (real or imagined) 
does not alter this instinctive “bond of solidarity”. Benjamin’s call for 
intellectuals to change the production relations within which they work, to 
find ways of democratising the apparatus, to create collaborators and co-
producers from their audience, must fight against the constant tendency of 
the broader social relations to shore up privilege and expertise (through 
cultural capital for example). The paradoxical task of the middle class 
counter-hegemonic intellectual is that they must aim to abolish their own 
conditions of existence, that is the class privilege from which they have 
emerged. Like withering the state, this has proved difficult to do, although 
there have been inspiring examples that provide pointers in the right 
direction.  
The democratisation of the function of intellectuality requires then the 
development of organic counter-hegemonic intellectuals from the working 
class itself, without which the middle-class intellectual cannot forge an 
organic relationship to any class but their own. The danger for organic 
intellectuals of the working class is that they become assimilated within the 
status quo leaving behind their own class and taking on the hegemonic 
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precepts of the class in which they find themselves but in which they are 
heavily outnumbered. The institutions, organisations and workplaces which 
once would have fostered and nurtured working class organic intellectuals 
no longer exist or have been neutralised. This means that the possibility of 
organising around the demands of working class life – one of the functions 
of the counter hegemonic intellectual- is severely limited.  As the neoliberal 
state privatises what once were accepted as public rights, the spaces for the 
counter hegemonic intellectual become severely restricted, particularly for 
those who wish to challenge the universalisation of middle class 
competitive individualisation. The choices for the working class counter 
hegemonic intellectual appear in our contemporary moment to be stark: 
incorporation into the traditional hegemonic institutions that reinforce the 
status quo –or an enforced, politically strategic marginalisation in which all 
conversations around class that actually include the working class are 
ignored. We have discussed how the digital media potentially and also in 
practice, have played a role in re-opening up civic-political spaces that have 
been closed down elsewhere. Of course it is not enough. Of course digital 
media openings for organic intellectuals in general must be linked with real 
political action, which must in turn be linked to re-enfranchising politically, 
socially and culturally, the working class.  The social order does not want 
the evaluation to be evaluated from the interests and perspectives of the 
working class. Which is why democratising the function of the intellectual 











1. Brand was accused of sexism by some high profile commentators. The 
delight with which they leapt onto his remarks about his ‘love of a good 
women’ curing him of sexism suggested a certain keenness to find 
something to attack him on and deflect away from the other unequal power 
relations he was drawing attention to. In fact Brand showed a good deal 
more reflexivity about his own sexism than his critics did of their own class 
privilege.  
 
2. See https://www.youtube.com/user/russellbrand.  
 
3. We do not agree with the argument that voluntary cultural labour for 
online digital dissemination constitutes ‘exploitation’ in the Marxist sense. 
Such labour produces no value directly (no ratio between investment and 
surplus extraction). Even when advertising makes use of this content, this is 
a re-distribution of value produced elsewhere by the workers who produce 
the goods which advertisers sell on behalf of their clients. Labour that 
chooses to produce what it wants, when it wants and without any direct 
economic compulsion, can in no way be described as ‘value producing’. If 
it was, there could be no Marxist theory of capitalist crisis rooted in the 
tendency for the rate of profit to fall. See Williamson elsewhere in this 
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